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PRESS COMMENT UPON TRIALS
By HON. STANLEY H. JOHNSON, Judge of the Juvenile Court
URING recent years the American press have indulged
increasingly in comments upon issues which have
fallen within the jurisdiction of the courts for trial. In
so doing, in many instances, they have seriously impeded the
administration of justice. The English courts have never
tolerated such action, but in America, either through ignorance, fear, inertia or too great an adherence to the constitutional principle of liberty of speech, our judges have been
overindulgent. The deplorable conditions of the Hauptmann
trial are an example of how this laxity disgraces important
trials with the aspect of a Gilbert and Sullivan comic opera.
A most interesting article was published upon this subject and the trial in the May number of the American Bar
Association Journal. It was also discussed by a member of
our own bar in Denver. That there is no privilege of the
press to comment upon facts or persons connected with an
issue at trial, or about to be tried, is well established in America as well as in England and should be well known. This is
especially true in Colorado in view of the decisions of the
Supreme Courts of Colorado and the United States in the
Patterson case. But there are also decisions in many other
states, some of which may be found in 13 Corpus Juris 34,
clearly stating that any comment or conduct of such a nature
as may tend to impede the proper administration of justice is
contempt of the court which has jurisdiction of the matter.
It would seem that no necessity exists for discussing this
well known rule. But a situation which arose recently in the
Juvenile Court disclosed an ignorance of the law. And the
history of criminal cases in Colorado and the comments
thereon of the Denver press indicate that there is a striking
need for education and reform by our courts.
In September an issue of dependency was tried in the
Juvenile Court before a jury concerning the custody of the
children of parents who had many times been the subject of
unfavorable comment in the press. The petition had been
filed upon July 8, 1935, and when a jury trial was demanded
the court issued an order detaining the children pending the
trial. During these proceedings, articles commenting rather
freely upon the history of the family appeared in the press.

DICTA

They might have been the cause of an action of contempt
against publishers and reporters.
Because of these and former articles of like nature, the
attorney for the father moved for change of venue on the
ground that the entire city, the judge and the officers of the
court were prejudiced. The motions were denied. Two jurors from the panel, however, were successfully challenged for
cause, and several others admitted having read articles but
denied prejudice.
During the first day of the trial, representatives of the
press were present. It was certain the case would last several
days and cost the city at least $300. In order to save expense
the jury must be released at adjournments. The court therefore warned the reporters that no editorial comments or anything but factual statements would be permitted. The order
was strictly complied with after the warning, but the reporters
for both papers came into chambers and expressed astonishment at the ruling, inquiring upon what legal authority the
order was founded. Both stated they knew of no such statute
in Colorado.
In People vs. News-Times Publishing Co., 35 Colo.
254, the publisher, Patterson, was punished for criminal contempt for the publication of disparaging comment upon the
decision of the Supreme Court justices in a case still pending
upon a petition for rehearing. Upon pages 360 to 381 of the
long opinion there is a discussion of authorities. The court
quotes with approval from its decision in the case of Cooper
vs. People, 13 Colo. 337, wherein the judge's character had
been attacked in a publication in connection with a case pending, the following language:
"Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly
in court by an impartial tribunal uninfluenced by newspaper dictation
or popular clamor. What would become of this right if the press may
use language in reference to a pending cause calculated to intimidate or
unduly influence and control judicial action? Days, and sometimes
weeks, are spent in endeavoring to secure an impartial jury for the trial
of a case; and when selected, it is encumbent upon the court to exercise

the utmost care in excluding evidence of matters foreign to the issues
involved, so that the minds of the jurors may not perchance be unduly
biased or prejudiced in reference either to litigants or to the matters
upon trial; but if an editor, a litigant, or those in sympathy with him,
should be permitted through the medium of the press by promises,
threats, invectives, sarcasm, or denunciation to influence the result of
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the trial, all the care taken in the selection of the jury, as well as the
precaution used to confine their attention at the trial solely to the issues
involved, will have been expended in vain."

In the Patterson case, at pages 392 to 394, it was also
decided that truth is no defense to the charge of contempt.
Publications of such a nature may amount to contempt at any
time after issuance of a warrant in a criminal case, or of a writ
or the filing of a complaint or petition in a civil cause:
State vs. Howell, 80 Conn. 668, 69 Atl. 1057;
Globe News Co. vs. Com., 188 Mass. 449, 74 N. E. 682;
Rex vs. Parke, 2 K. B. 432.
But not after a cause is ended.

Patterson vs. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454;
Cooper vs. People, 13 Colo. 373;
But see Burdett vs. Com., 103 Va. 838, 846, 48 S.E. 878.
In Patterson vs. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, at 462, Mr.
Justice Holmes expressed the following opinion:
"A publication likely to reach the eyes of a jury, declaring a witness in a pending cause a perjurer, would be none the
less a contempt that it was true. It would tend to obstruct
the administration of justice, because even a correct conclusion
is not to be reached or helped in that way, if our system of
trials is to be maintained. The theory of our system is that
conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside
influence, whether of private talk or public print. When a
case is finished, courts are subject to the same criticism as other
people; but the propriety and necessity of preventing interference with the course of justice by premature statement, argument or intimdation hardly can be denied."
The purpose of this article is not to analyze and exhaust
the law upon the subject; it is too clear to require more than
these brief examples. But to the writer it has appeared that
the freedom exercised by the press without restraint by our
courts endangers the fairness of our trials, exposes the public
to expense from potential mistrials and tends to bring our
places of justice into contempt. There is no reason to suppose that, with proper warning and education from the
courts, the press will not cooperate in doing away with this
mischief. No one would wish to see the liberty of the press
curtailed except in instances where it impairs a more important right.

